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Abstract 
Transitional justice has shifted from its primary use in 
addressing past atrocities of authoritarian regimes to those acts 
of violence committed during civil wars.  Yet the use of 
transitional justice mechanisms in this new context is not well 
understood.  Drawing from the existing transitional justice 
literature, this article generates a set of testable hypotheses to 
explore which factors influence the use of particular mechanisms 
during and after conflict.  It then tests those hypotheses in 151 
cases of civil war by using a cross-national data base of all 
countries in the world and their adoption of transitional justice 
                                                        
1 The authors would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their 
helpful comments on the manuscript; but any errors are of course our own.   
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processes from 1970-2007.  This article further provides a 
preliminary analysis of the success of those mechanisms in 
obtaining and securing peace.  The article concludes that 
amnesties remain more prevalent than trials during and after 
conflict, particularly in Africa and Asia.  During conflict, higher 
death tolls are associated with the use of trials and amnesties, 
and longer wars with the use of all types of mechanisms.  After 
conflict ends, however, longer wars and higher death tolls are 
associated with accountability, and the presence of international 
peacekeepers is associated with all types of mechanisms.  Finally, 
we find that transitional justice—regardless of the particular 
form it takes—does not jeopardize the peace process, and that 
amnesties may be an effective tool to help end conflict. 
 
Introduction 
Transitional justice—the set of processes designed to respond to 
past human rights violations—has traditionally focused on 
political transitions from authoritarian rule to democracy.2  Yet 
in the past two decades international and domestic actors have 
adapted those mechanisms to the context of civil war.  The 
United Nations ad hoc tribunals to address ethno-nationalist 
conflict in Yugoslavia and genocide in Rwanda, and hybrid 
courts to confront secessionist struggles in East Timor illustrate 
this shift.  Domestic truth commissions have also responded to 
ongoing civil wars (e.g., Colombia) and to the aftermath of war 
(e.g., Liberia).   
This shift toward the use of transitional justice in the 
context of civil war will likely endure.  After all, the number of 
post-authoritarian settings has begun to wane.  Most countries 
of the third wave of democratization and the relatively short but 
explosive fourth wave of democratization have already adopted 
transitional justice processes.  Fewer authoritarian state 
transitions demanding transitional justice occur today.  In 
                                                        
2 Ruti Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy,” Harvard Human Rights Journal 
16 (2003): 69-94. 
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contrast, civil wars continue to proliferate around the world, 
offering new opportunities for transitional justice.  Secessionist 
movements and ethnic tensions challenge the territorial integrity 
of newly independent states in Central Asia and the Balkans.  
Ongoing conflicts in Africa, as Sudan and the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo illustrate, demand resolution.  Civil war 
violence also has spillover effects, extending the conflict into 
neighboring countries.  In addition, heinous abuses, such as 
sexual and reproductive violence, forced conscription of 
children, and genocide provoke international moral outrage and 
a corresponding global demand for effective solutions.   
Transitional justice has offered a potential solution to 
these ongoing problems.  It seeks to play a key role in the 
resolution of, and recovery from, civil war, and it will likely 
continue to do so.  Yet civil war contexts present particular 
challenges for transitional justice.  The magnitude of violent 
abuses render any attempt to address the past difficult, but the 
higher number of abuses associated with civil wars exacerbate 
those difficulties.  Estimates range from over five million civil 
war deaths since World War II3 to more than 16 million.4  In 
addition, while authoritarian regime transitions tend to involve 
abuses by one set of actors, war tends to involve complicity on 
both sides.  Rather than a clearly demarcated transition, 
moreover, both sides of the conflict in civil wars retain the 
potential to remobilize violently against transitional justice 
decisions that threaten their interests.  An additional challenge 
involves ongoing violence.  In transitions from authoritarian 
rule, new democratic governments tend to implement 
transitional justice.  In civil war contexts, these mechanisms 
                                                        
3 Bethany Lacina, “Explaining the Severity of Civil Wars,” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 50 (2006): 276-289; Bethany Lacina and Nils P. Gleditsch, 
“Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of Battle Deaths,” 
European Journal of Population 21 (2005): 145-166. 
4 James D. Fearon and David Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” 
American Political Science Review 97 (2003): 75-90. 
3
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sometimes occur as a mechanism for ending violence.  
Transitional justice provides a new tool in the effort to bring 
peace: a truth commission to acknowledge and reconcile war 
atrocities; an amnesty to promote disarmament; or trials to 
punish and deter certain violent acts.   
Despite strong evidence of a shift in the use of 
transitional justice toward civil wars, little empirical research 
analyzes its use or its impact in this new context.  This article 
does so.  It explores which transitional justice mechanisms 
countries adopt during and after civil war.  It further analyzes 
the factors that shape particular choices.  It also provides a 
preliminary reflection on transitional justice’s success in 
establishing and maintaining peace.  To accomplish these tasks 
the article draws on the Transitional Justice Data Base (TJDB), a 
cross-national data base of all countries in the world and their 
adoption of transitional justice processes between 1970 and 
2007.5  While the dataset includes information on reparations 
and lustration/vetting programs, this article focuses on the 
adoption of three main transitional justice mechanisms—trials, 
truth commissions, and amnesties—in 151 cases of civil war in 
91 countries.  These three mechanisms are at the center of the 
theoretical debates regarding transitional justice and are those 
for which the most comprehensive data was collected.  Using 
empirical analysis to assess the adoption of transitional justice 
processes to civil war contexts offers a first critical step in 
establishing where and how transitional justice might bring 
peace to worn-torn countries.   
 
Transitional justice and civil war 
                                                        
5 For more information about the coding of mechanisms and the 
construction of the dataset see: Tricia D. Olsen, Leigh A. Payne, and Andrew 
G. Reiter, Transitional Justice in Balance: Comparing Processes, Weighing Efficacy 
(Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2010); Tricia D. 
Olsen, Leigh A. Payne, and Andrew G. Reiter, “Transitional Justice in the 
World, 1970-2007: Insights from a New Dataset,” Journal of Peace Research 47 
(2010): 803-809.  The data are available here: http://www.tjdbproject.com/ 
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Some scholars recommend a new “post-conflict justice” term to 
reflect the civil war context that transitional justice mechanisms 
increasingly address.6  The International Center for Transitional 
Justice (ICTJ) continues to use the old term, but has redefined it.  
To its previous definition of transitional justice, the ICTJ adds 
“recognition for the victims and [the promotion of] possibilities 
for peace, reconciliation, and democracy” to its older definition 
of transitional justice as “a response to systematic or widespread 
violations of human rights.”7  The shift might also constitute a 
fourth phase of Ruti Teitel’s three-phase transitional justice 
genealogy.8  It could become part of the “new landscape of 
transitional justice” that Naomi Roht-Arriaza identifies.9  
Extending transitional justice to new civil war contexts might 
further confirm the diffusion of a global accountability norm 
and set of models embodied in the “justice cascade”10 and 
“justice revolution”11 concepts. 
A debate over the particular mechanisms appropriate to 
the civil war context has accompanied the shift.  Some studies 
promote amnesty as a mechanism to ensure peace.12  These 
                                                        
6 M. Bassiouni, Cherif, ed., Post-Conflict Justice (Ardsley: Transnational, 2002). 
7 International Center for Transitional Justice, “What is Transitional Justice?” 
http://www.ictj.org. 
8 Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
9 Naomi Roht-Arriaza and Javier Mariezcurrena, eds., Transitional Justice in the 
Twenty-First Century: Beyond Truth versus Justice (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006).   
10 Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How human rights prosecutions are changing 
world politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2011); Ellen Lutz and 
Kathryn Sikkink, “The Justice Cascade: The Evolution and Impact of Foreign 
Human Rights Trials in Latin America,” Chicago Journal of International Law 2 
(2001): 1-33; Kathryn Sikkink and Carrie Booth Walling, “The Impact of 
Human Rights Trials in Latin America,” Journal of Peace Research 44 (2007): 
427-445. 
11 Chandra Lekha Sriram, Globalizing Justice for Mass Atrocities: A Revolution in 
Accountability (New York: Routledge, 2005). 
12 E.g. Tonya Putnam, “Human Rights and Sustainable Peace,” in Ending Civil 
Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements, eds. Stephen John Stedman, 
5
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scholars warn against the danger of accountability measures, 
such as trials or truth commissions, to post-conflict situations.  
They view them as provoking spoilers, who would undermine 
the peace process by using violence to threaten, destabilize, or 
even topple the current regime and heighten or recommence the 
conflict.13  Accountability mechanisms may also backfire and 
stimulate, rather than deter, violence if actors view them as 
victor’s justice or if they open old wounds between former 
warring enemies.14  Assurances of amnesty, on the other hand, 
may encourage potential spoilers to accept compromise and 
share power in the new political system.15  Peace agreements that 
include amnesty can thus “mark a clear turning point between 
the conflict-ridden and impunity-plagued climate of the past and 
a new, much more peaceable social climate.”16  The failure to use 
amnesties, in contrast, could prolong violence and forestall 
peace and stability.  While these scholars often note the 
importance of justice following atrocity, in some cases, 
amnesties may be a “necessary evil.”17 
                                                                                                                   
Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2002), 237-272. 
13 Stephen John Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” International 
Security 22 (1997): 5-53. 
14 William J. Long and Peter Brecke, War and Reconciliation: Reason and Emotions 
in Conflict Resolution (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003); Tom Hadden, 
“Punishment, Amnesty and Truth: Legal and Political Approaches,” in 
Democracy and Ethnic Conflict: Advancing Peace in Deeply Divided Societies, ed. 
Adrian Guelke (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 196-217. 
15 Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri, “Trials and Errors: Principle and 
Pragmatism in Strategies of International Justice,” International Security 28 
(2003): 5-44; Helena Cobban, “Thinking Again: International Courts,” Foreign 
Policy 153 (2006): 22-28. 
16 Helena Cobban, Amnesty After Atrocity? Healing Nations After Genocide and 
War Crimes (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2007), 199. 
17 Mark Freeman, Necessary Evils: Amnesties and the Search for Justice (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
6
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A different set of scholars view amnesties as a threat to 
peace.18  The failure to address past abuses, they argue, leads to 
cycles of retributive violence19 or vigilante justice.20  Trials and 
truth commissions, on the other hand, provide the means to 
reconcile past civil violence and build the foundation for lasting 
peace.   
This debate over amnesty and accountability echoes an 
earlier debate in the democratic transitions literature over the 
trade-offs between justice and stability in the post-authoritarian 
context.21  Scholars have contemplated whether authoritarian 
regime factors or characteristics associated with the transition 
process influence countries’ transitional justice choices.  In civil 
war contexts, we derived a similar set of possible explanatory 
factors:  the nature of the conflict itself (i.e., the severity of the 
violence, the source of incompatibility, the duration, and the 
degree of international intervention) and the type of conflict 
termination.  The discussion of these factors generates a set of 
specific, testable hypotheses that seek to explain how and when 
countries adopt transitional justice in civil war contexts.   
 
Conflict severity   
                                                        
18 Tove Grete Lie, Helga Malmin Binningsbø, and Scott Gates, “Postconflict 
Justice and Sustainable Peace,” Post-conflict Transitions Working Paper No. 
5, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4191 (2007). 
19 Donna Pankhurst, “Issues of Justice and Reconciliation in Complex 
Political Emergencies: Conceptualizing Reconciliation, Justice and Peace,” 
Third World Quarterly 20 (1999): 239-256; Richard J. Goldstone, “Exposing 
Human Rights Abuses – A Help or Hindrance to Reconciliation?” Hastings 
Constitutional Law Quarterly 22 (1995): 607-621. 
20 Gary J. Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Jon Elster, Closing the Books: 
Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004). 
21 For a review of this debate see chapter 1 in Olsen, Payne, and Reiter, 
Transitional Justice in Balance. 
7
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Scholars of authoritarian transitions consider the level of 
repression to play a critical role in transitional justice choices.  
They expect, for example, that a higher number of abuses will 
increase the likelihood that the state will adopt transitional 
justice mechanisms, specifically trials or truth commissions.22  
The explanation behind such choices depends in part on the role 
that high levels of atrocities play in mobilizing domestic demand 
for accountability among victim and survivor groups.  High 
levels of violations of human rights will also likely increase 
international attention to abuses and pressure on the state to 
hold perpetrators of that violence accountable.   
Similar to authoritarian state repression, violence varies 
across civil war cases.  The range includes minor conflicts, in 
which a few dozen individuals die, to major wars resulting in the 
deaths of millions of civilians and hundreds of thousands of 
combatants on both sides.  While the authoritarian literature 
focuses on the violation of individuals’ human rights by state 
security forces, in the civil war context we examine violence 
resulting from conflict between state and non-state actors 
(rebels).  To establish a measure of the severity of conflicts that 
allows for comparison across cases, we use battle deaths, defined 
as “deaths resulting directly from violence inflicted through the 
use of armed force by a party to an armed conflict during 
contested combat.”23  The assumptions in the authoritarian 
transitions literature would suggest  that the greater the level of 
violence, the higher the demand for acccountability.  This 
should hold true during and after civil war, but the effect should 
                                                        
22 Luc Huyse, “Justice after Transition: On the Choices Successor Elites 
Making in Dealing with the Past,” Law and Social Inquiry 20 (1995): 51-78; 
David Pion-Berlin, “To Prosecute or to Pardon? Human Rights Decisions in 
the Latin American Southern Cone,” Human Rights Quarterly 15 (1993): 105-
130; Carlos S. Nino, Radical Evil on Trial (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1996). 
23 Bethany Lacina, “Battle Deaths Dataset 1946-2005: Codebook for Version 
2.0,” Centre for the Study of Civil War, International Peace Research 
Institute, Oslo (2006). 
8
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be stronger following civil war when accountability mechanisms 
are easier to implement.   Thus the following hypothesis 
emerges: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Conflicts with more battle deaths are more likely 
to lead to trials and/or truth commissions, and are less 
likely to lead to amnesties. 
 
Incompatibility 
The authoritarian transitions literature notes that certain types of 
authoritarian regimes limit the ability of a new democracy to 
pursue transitional justice.  Those democracies emerging from 
military regimes face the reality that the military, as an 
institution, will continue to exist.  Thus, the military, while 
formally stepping down from power, remains a key political 
actor and can significantly influence the transitional justice 
debate.24  Likewise, certain conflicts greatly inhibit negotiation 
between political actors and shape transitional justice options.  
Scholars typically distinguish two types of civil war: those fought 
over control of the central government (revolutionary) and those 
fought over the control of territory (secessionist).  In 
revolutionary wars, existing government forces confront one or 
more domestic rebel groups who attempt to capture the state.  
In these cases, the state would likely punish rebels during and 
after conflict to eliminate potential threats and deter future 
rebellions.  If the rebel group succeeds in capturing the state, it 
would likely solidify its power by punishing former state leaders.  
In the scenario of revolutionary wars, therefore, neither amnesty 
nor truth commissions provide adequate punishment to make 
them attractive to either faction. 
                                                        
24 Carmen González-Enríquez, Paloma Aguilar, and Alexandra Barahona de 
Brito, “Conclusions,” in The Politics of Memory: Transitional Justice in 
Democratizing Societies, Alexandra Barahona de Brito, Carmen González-
Enríquez, and Paloma Aguilar, eds., (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2001), 303-314 
9
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In secessionist wars, on the other hand, two or more 
groups compete over the control of particular geographic 
regions.  These wars do not challenge the existence of the 
current government, but rather its sovereignty over a particular 
territory.  During these cases, the state may offer amnesties to 
breakaway forces in hopes of unifying and consolidating the 
country.  If victorious in the conflict, the state will likely use 
amnesties to appease and incorporate former secessionist forces.   
If the breakaway region were to succeed in separating 
from the state and establishing a new state, trials or truth 
commissions would seem unlikely.  Extradition would be 
necessary for perpetrators of past crimes to stand trial in one of 
the two states.  Yet the two countries would be unlikely to reach 
extradition agreements and perpetrators would avoid traveling to 
hostile territory.  In addition, neither sovereign state would likely 
put its own combatants on trial for acts committed during these 
wars.  A truth commission is also improbable due to the amount 
of cooperation needed between two states recently at war with 
one another.  In sum: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Revolutionary wars are more likely to lead to 
trials, while secessionist wars are more likely to lead to 
amnesties. 
 
Conflict duration 
Scholars identify duration of rule as a determining factor in 
transitional justice decisions following authoritarianism.  They 
contend that the longer the prior authoritarian regime ruled, the 
greater the constraints on transitional justice.25  Long-standing 
authoritarian regimes are often deeply-institutionalized.  
Authoritarian legacies thus linger beyond the transition, 
permeating political, social, and cultural life, and stymieing the 
emergence of independent judiciaries willing and able to 
challenge former regime leaders.  In addition, after long periods 
                                                        
25 Ibid. 
10
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of authoritarian rule, civil society is often weak.  These factors 
lead the new democratic government to accommodate, rather 
than confront, old authoritarian forces, pursuing strategies of 
amnesty rather than trials or truth commissions. 
Conflict and post-conflict settings experience some 
parallels in terms of duration.  Conflicts vary perhaps more 
dramatically than authoritarian regimes, ranging from single, 
violent events to decade-long wars.  Long conflicts tend to lead 
to more cumulative abuses and a greater number of victims, 
motivating more domestic and international demand for 
accountability.  Additional factors, however, may temper these 
demands.  William Zartman refers to long intractable conflicts as 
“ripe for resolution” when peace appears more attractive to both 
sides than continued fighting.26  Scholars argue that “ripeness” is 
particularly high in situations of military stalemate where both 
sides face a determined opponent and where the eventual victor 
is difficult to predict.27 
Societies exhausted from long wars, therefore, may not 
risk peace by implementing potentially destabilizing 
prosecutions.  We would expect states emerging from these 
conflicts to avoid the use of trials.  Furthermore, lengthy wars 
likely involve a high number of individuals complicit in the 
abuses in some way, thus rendering the determination of which 
perpetrators to hold accountable infeasible and 
counterproductive.  In such a scenario, states would likely select 
amnesties and truth commissions.  Longer wars also typically 
                                                        
26 I. William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); Stephen John Stedman, Peacemaking 
in Civil Wars (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991). 
27 George Modelski, “International Settlement of Internal War,” in 
International Aspects of Civil Strife, James Rosenau, ed. (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1964): 122-153; I. William Zartman, “The Timing of Peace 
Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments,” in Contemporary 
Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes, John Darby and Roger 
MacGinty, eds. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003): 19-29. 
11
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indicate greater parity between the sides, making amnesties more 
likely.  In addition, states may use truth commissions to attempt 
to reconstruct national history fragmented by violence.  This 
situation leads to the following hypothesis:    
 
Hypothesis 3: Conflicts of longer duration are more likely to 
lead to amnesties and/or truth commissions, and are less 
likely to lead to trials. 
 
International intervention 
The scholarship on authoritarian regime transitions assumes an 
integral role for international forces in determining transitional 
justice choices by countries addressing past human rights 
violations.  This results from the expansion of international law, 
the work of IGOs and INGOs, the rise of international and 
hybrid courts, and the emergence of universal jurisdiction.  
Many scholars argue that countries face increasing pressure to 
hold perpetrators of human rights violations accountable for 
their acts.  To date, however, few studies have measured, 
systematically and comparatively, the influence of international 
actors on state decision-making regarding transitional justice in 
war situations.  Case study evidence suggests, however, that 
where international actors promote accountability, trials will 
occur.28  The literature further assumes that a strong civil society 
with transnational linkages will advocate accountability for 
perpetrators of human rights violations.29 
These assumptions about the role of international 
factors in transitional justice adoption apply particularly well to 
                                                        
28 Victor Peskin, International Justice in Rwanda and the Balkans: Virtual Trials and 
the Struggle for State Cooperation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008); 
Sriram. 
29 David Backer, “Civil Society and Transitional Justice: Possibilities, Patterns 
and Prospects,” Journal of Human Rights 2 (2003): 297-313; Michelle Sieff and 
Leslie Vinjamuri Wright, “Reconciling Order and Justice? New Institutional 
Solutions in Post-Conflict States,” Journal of International Affairs 52 (1999): 757-
779. 
12
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civil war cases.  Some scholars contend, for example, that liberal 
states tend to promote trials in conflicts in which their own 
citizens and soldiers face harm.30  Thus if the international 
community has invested significant resources, particularly 
troops, with the goal of ending a conflict, it tends to play a larger 
role in affecting decisions about truth and justice.  Specifically, 
international actors prefer trials or truth commissions to 
amnesties.31  If the accountability norm exists—and it is 
transmitted to state actors—states would likely choose domestic 
trials and truth commissions regardless of whether the 
international community operates such mechanisms itself to deal 
with the conflict.  This should also hold for ongoing conflicts as 
well as post-conflict settings, although states will likely 
implement accountability mechanisms after conflict, if they can, 
to avoid tensions.  While international pressure takes many 
forms, we take a conservative approach and examine the 
presence or absence of peacekeepers.  If international pressure 
does affect transitional justice choices we should observe some 
effect in the broader set of cases.  This leads to the following 
hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 4: Conflicts where international peacekeepers are 
present are more likely to lead to trials and/or truth 
commissions, and less likely to lead to amnesties. 
Conflict termination 
In post-conflict scenarios, transitional justice mechanisms 
should increase because the end of violence facilitates the state’s 
                                                        
30 Bass 
31  At times, the international community may actually take the lead and 
institute transitional justice mechanisms itself.  The International Criminal 
Court and the International Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
represent two such institutions of accountability.  Because domestic actors 
have little role in creating these ad hoc bodies, we exclude them from this 
analysis, since our focus is on measuring the impact of international actors on 
domestic decision-making. 
13
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ability to pursue all types of mechanisms.  Conflicts end in a 
variety of ways, however, increasing the challenges for 
transitional justice.  The fighting may end due to the military 
victory of one side over the other, or alternatively, fighting may 
end because of a ceasefire or negotiated settlement.  Wars that 
end in military victory face fewer constraints in adopting 
prosecutions or truth commissions.  The winning party has 
relatively free reign to enact justice without fear of violent 
retribution or destabilization.  State victory will lead to 
prosecutions that aim to punish past challenges to state authority 
and deter future rebellion.32  A rebel victory over the state will 
create even greater incentives to hold former state actors 
accountable as a form of retribution.  The new regime may also 
utilize such actions to establish a break with the past and 
discredit the old regime, thus paving the way for an easier 
consolidation of its new power.  
Conflicts ending in negotiation often involve complex 
settlements with an array of power-sharing and power-dividing 
institutions.33  Negotiated settlements range from simple 
ceasefires or complex peace agreements.  Many of these 
agreements include amnesty for one or both sides of the conflict 
as a condition for signing.  The cooperation, coexistence, and 
compromise inherent in negotiated settlements would render 
prosecutions highly unlikely, but allow for truth commissions, 
particularly if they involve amnesty and protection of 
perpetrators’ identities.34  These approaches to conflict 
termination suggest the following hypothesis: 
 
                                                        
32 Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide 
and Mass Violence (Boston: Beacon Press, 1999). 
33 Caroline A. Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie, Crafting Peace: Power-Sharing 
Institutions and the Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars (University Park: The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007). 
34 Rajeev Bhargava, “Restoring Decency to Barbaric Societies,” in Truth v. 
Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions, Robert I. Rotberg and Dennis 
Thompson, eds. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000): 45-67. 
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Hypothesis 5: Conflicts ending via negotiated settlements are 
more likely to result in truth commissions and/or 
amnesties, while conflicts ending in victory are more 
likely to lead to trials. 
 
Insights from the authoritarian transitions and civil war 
literatures generate a set of hypotheses regarding transitional 
justice choices in the contemporary civil war context.  Testing 
these hypotheses helps to discern the factors that most likely 
affect state decision-making surrounding transitional justice 
mechanisms.  Before turning to that analysis, the next section of 
the article explains our sample selection, the data compilation 
process of the TJDB, and the data sources for the explanatory 
variables we use to test the five hypotheses. 
  
 
Sample and data 
To analyze transitional justice in countries engaged in internal 
armed conflict we use a subset of the TJDB.  We describe that 
subset below, as well as the operationalization of the explanatory 
factors that may lead to the adoption of transitional justice 
mechanisms during and post-conflict. 
 
Sample 
To test the hypotheses surrounding civil war and transitional 
justice decisions, our universe of cases comprises all internal 
armed conflicts that occurred from 1970-2005.  These include 
those conflicts ending during this period as well as those in 
which fighting is ongoing.  We examine cases of internal armed 
conflict and internationalized internal armed conflict as defined 
by the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset.35  That dataset 
                                                        
35 Nils P. Gleditsch et al., “Armed conflict, 1946-2001: A New Dataset,” 
Journal of Peace Research 39 (2002): 615-637.  Battle death data is only available 
through 2005, thus we exclude those conflicts beginning after 2004.  In 
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defines armed conflict as “…a contested incompatibility that 
concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed 
force between two parties, of which at least one is the 
government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related 
deaths.”36   
The data base includes minor conflicts (25-999 battle 
deaths per year) and major wars (more than 1,000 battle deaths 
in at least one year).  We code a new, separate conflict after a 
five-year gap between years of at least 25 battle deaths.37  This 
selection process yields 151 cases of internal armed conflict in 91 
countries.  The 151 cases include 67 major wars and 94 minor 
conflicts.  A full listing is included in the appendix. 
Utilizing this selection method means that the sample 
includes coups and coup attempts, minor armed revolts, and 
small skirmishes.  The literature on transitional justice literature 
tends to ignore these types of cases despite the frequent use of 
transitional justice mechanisms in their aftermath.  The 
government of Trinidad and Tobago, for example, granted an 
amnesty to Muslim insurgents who forcefully took over 
parliament in 1990.  The State Security Court in Tunisia 
convicted 39 individuals for their role in an insurgent attack that 
seized the city of Gafsa in January 1980.  Kenya established a 
Special Judicial Commission of Inquiry to examine the activities 
of former minister Charles Njonjo and his role in the attempted 
Air Force-led coup in August 1982.  Responses to minor 
conflicts occur frequently, include great variation, and can have 
profound political implications.  Had Hugo Chavez failed to 
receive an amnesty following the coup attempt he led in 
                                                                                                                   
addition, we do not include four cases for which no battle death data is 
available; Israel-Southern Lebanon (1990-1999); Mauritania-Western Sahara 
(1975-1978); Pakistan-Baluchistan (2004-2007); Ethiopia-Afar (1975-1976). 
36 UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook, Version 4-2009. We 
exclude extra-systemic (often termed colonial) wars and interstate wars. 
37 This corresponds to the onset5 coding delineated in Håvard Strand , 
“Onset of Armed Conflict: A New List for the Period 1946-2004, with 
Applications,” unpublished manuscript (2006). 
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February 1992, for example, he would probably not have 
ascended to power in Venezuela.  In addition to the frequently 
decades-long civil wars at the forefront of transitional justice 
research, (e.g., Colombia, Guatemala, Cambodia, and Uganda), 
around 25 percent of the conflicts in the data base last only a 
year or less.  The average conflict is eleven years in length, while 
the median conflict lasts five years. 
 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable in this analysis is a series of 
dichotomous variables that denote the transitional justice 
mechanisms, if any, that states use to address past abuses for 
each conflict.  We include only those mechanisms directly 
related to the conflict, excluding others that the state may have 
implemented to address other conflicts or abuses committed 
under an authoritarian regime.  We focus on five mechanisms: 
trials (for state agents and rebels), truth commissions, and 
amnesties (for state agents and rebels).  For each case in the 
dataset, we note the use of these mechanisms at any time during 
the conflict.  For those cases that have terminated, we also 
analyze the use of these mechanisms any time after termination 
until the present.  
The TJDB defines trials as occurring when a court of 
law holds perpetrators of human rights violations criminally 
accountable.  The state may use trials to hold rebels as well as 
agents of the state accountable for acts committed during the 
conflict.  We include only domestic trials, excluding those 
operated directly by international actors, and only trials that 
conclude with a verdict.38  The TJDB defines truth commissions 
as newly established, temporary bodies officially sanctioned by 
                                                        
38 We should note, however, that only one state (Sierra Leone) experienced an 
internationally operated trial without also pursuing its own domestic 
prosecutions, thus including or excluding international mechanisms does not 
change the results of the analysis. 
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the state to investigate a pattern of human rights abuses.39  This 
definition closely matches others in the field.40  It excludes pre-
existing government institutions that investigate past human 
rights violations as part of their official duties.  The TJDB 
includes amnesties in its dataset, despite the fact that many 
transitional justice studies exclude them.  As Jack Snyder and 
Leslie Vinjamuri41 and others have claimed, and previous 
research using the TJDB confirms,42 state leaders consider 
amnesty a tool for resolving past atrocities.  The database codes 
amnesties when a state officially declares that those accused or 
convicted of human rights violations, whether individuals or 
groups, will not be prosecuted, further prosecuted, and/or will 
be pardoned for their crimes and released from prison.  As with 
trials, states can grant amnesties to one or both sides of the 
conflict. 
The TJDB was constructed by systematically analyzing 
Keesing’s World News Archives, a catalog of world events.43  
Keesing’s provides the coverage—geographic and temporal—
necessary to develop a cross-national dataset of transitional 
justice over nearly four decades.  Utilizing news sources from 
around the world, including newspapers and wire services, and 
government reports, Keesing’s provides an unparalleled source 
of unbiased summaries of world events.  Finally, Keesing’s 
constitutes a respected and reliable resource for coverage of 
                                                        
39 We exclude non-state, independent projects, which investigate and uncover 
the truth about past violations since they do not represent official decisions 
on behalf of state actors.  
40 See, for example, Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Facing the Challenge 
of Truth Commissions (New York: Routledge, 2001). 
41 Snyder and Vinjamuri. 
42 Olsen, Payne, and Reiter, Transitional Justice in Balance; also see: Tricia D. 
Olsen, Leigh A. Payne, and Andrew G. Reiter, “The Justice Balance: When 
Transitional Justice Improves Human Rights and Democracy,” Human Rights 
Quarterly 32 (2010): 980-1007. 
43  Keesing’s World News Archives includes Keesing’s Contemporary 
Archives (1931-1987) and Keesing’s Record of World Events (1987-Present).   
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political, social, and economic events used widely in the field,44 
making it an ideal resource for information on transitional 
justice mechanisms.  The dataset begins in 1970.  While 
transitional justice mechanisms occurred prior to that year, this 
time frame captures the commencement of the era in which 
these mechanisms began to assume a more frequent and 
prominent role in the aftermath of atrocity, and heightened 
attention by scholars and policymakers. 
 
Independent variables 
To measure the severity of the conflict we use a count of battle 
deaths taken from the Battle Deaths Dataset 1946-2005.45  From 
this measure, we calculate the log of the average annual battle 
deaths for the duration of the conflict.  The Uppsala/PRIO 
Armed Conflict Dataset also provides a conflict incompatibility 
variable determining whether the conflict refers to control over 
government or territory.46  We measure the duration of the 
conflict in whole years starting from the first year the conflict 
reached the minimum threshold of at least 25 annual battle 
deaths until the last such year, according to Uppsala/PRIO 
Armed Conflict Dataset figures.  For inactive conflicts, we 
utilize data on conflict termination drawn from the UCDP 
                                                        
44 Jan Oskar Engene (2007). “Five Decades of Terrorism in Europe: The 
TWEED Dataset,” Journal of Peace Research 44 (2007): 109-121; Barbara 
Walter, Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2002); Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, 
Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2006). 
45 Lacina, “Explaining the Severity”; Lacina and Gleditsch 
46  The Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset codes for three types of 
incompatibility, government, territory, and both government and territory. 
The latter category, however, applies only to some extra-systemic wars in the 
Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset and does not apply to any of the 
cases of internal conflict used in our analysis. 
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Conflict Termination Data Set; we code for military victory or 
negotiated termination via ceasefire or peace agreement.47 
To measure international influence we include an 
indicator variable for whether UN peacekeeping missions 
occurred in each case.48  Other international actors, such as the 
African Union or third party states, can also intervene in 
conflicts.  Likewise, the UN can play other roles in mediating 
conflicts outside of sending a full peacekeeping mission.  The 
UN, however, has taken far more initiative on transitional justice 
than any other organization or state, and the presence of actual 
troops ensures a particular depth of interest in the case.  Finally, 
based on the UN Statistics Division’s region codes, we include 
regional controls by categorizing each case according to whether 
it took place in the Americas, Europe, Africa, or Asia.49 
 
  
                                                        
47  This is not a dichotomous variable; many cases fall outside these categories 
because the number of battle deaths simply drops below the threshold 
required for inclusion.  There the conflict becomes inactive, but there is no 
clear victor and there has not been a negotiated end to the fighting.  See: 
Joakim Kreutz, “UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset Codebook for Version 
2.1,” Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Department of Peace and Conflict 
Research, Uppsala University (2006); Joakim Kreutz, “How Armed Conflicts 
End,” unpublished manuscript (2006). 
48  For a complete list of UN Peacekeeping Missions, past and present, see: 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/pastops.shtml. 
49  Composition of UN regions can be found at the UN Statistics Division 
here: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm.  Note that 
we combine Asia and Oceania into one region—Asia—to better facilitate 
comparison. 
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Analysis and findings 
Using the data described above, we test the hypotheses derived 
from the literature.  The section below presents descriptive 
statistics on our dependent variable, as well as the results of two 
multivariate models on the use of transitional justice during and 
after conflict.  We make several observations.  First, the 
summary statistics highlight important differences in mechanism 
use during and after conflict, as well as trends over time.  
Second, the multivariate analyses illustrate that not all of the 
causal factors identified in the existing literature prevail in the 
analysis of transitional justice in the civil war context.  After 
discussing these findings, we conclude by exploring the 
contribution of these findings in building a new analytical 
framework for transitional justice in civil war contexts.  
 
Descriptive statistics 
The conflicts in our sample vary widely in terms of severity.  
Battle deaths range from 25, the minimum needed in one year to 
qualify as an armed conflict, to over 500,000, as in the long 
conflict in Afghanistan.  Just under half of the conflicts (65 of 
151) in our analysis were fought over territory, while over half 
fought over control of the central government (86).  Of those 
that terminated (118 cases), in nearly four in ten conflicts (45 
cases), one side was victorious over the other, while three in ten 
(36 cases) ended via negotiation.  The remaining cases (37) 
ended simply due to inactivity, with no clear victor and no 
negotiated settlement—the conflict simply petered out.  Of 
those that terminated in victory, states hold a nearly three-to-one 
advantage over rebels (33 to 12, respectively).  The UN 
intervened in nearly one in five conflicts (28 of 151); in eight 
cases, the UN intervened while the conflict was ongoing; in 13 
cases, following the cessation of violence; and in seven cases, the 
UN intervened both during and after the war. 
A variety of transitional justice mechanisms designed to 
address the violence accompany civil wars.  Well over half of our 
21
Reiter et al.: Transitional Justice and Civil War
Published by Scholarship@Western, 2013
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
158  Transitional Justice and Civil War 
 
 
Transitional Justice Review, Vol.1, Iss.1, 2012, 137-169 
 
cases (94 of 151) involve the enactment of at least one 
transitional justice mechanism, and quite often countries adopt 
more than one mechanism (50 of 151).  In many cases, states use 
amnesties in conjunction with truth commissions (22), truth 
commissions and trials (9), and trials and amnesties (18).  Truth 
commissions occur most frequently in the worst conflicts 
measured by battle deaths and the longest wars.  Trials of rebels 
occur most often following short, minor conflicts (see Table 1). 
 
 
Table 1.  Summary Statistics:  
Transitional Justice and Civil War 
 
 During Conflict After Conflict 
 
Reb. 
Trials 
State 
Trials 
TC 
Reb 
Amn. 
State 
Amn. 
Reb.  
Trials 
State 
Trials 
TC 
Reb. 
Amn. 
State 
Amn. 
Cases 9 8 11 54 17 11 11 14 41 17 
Avg. Ann. 
Battle Deaths 
2,161 3,944 4,784 2,290 4,594 1,823 2,304 5,183 2,071 3,000 
Revolutionary 2 6 10 35 14 5 6 12 28 10 
Avg. Conflict 
Duration (Yrs) 
13 17.5 24.5 16 19.9 3.6 8.6 10.1 6.5 8.2 
UN 
Peacekeepers 
4 1 3 8 4 5 7 6 15 9 
Peace 
Agreements 
2 2 0 18 7 4 4 5 15 8 
Victory 2 1 0 7 2 5 4 6 19 8 
 
Overall, amnesty granted toward rebels appears as the 
most common mechanism used during and after conflict.  
Relative to other mechanisms, states use amnesties most 
frequently during the conflict, but the gap shrinks in the post-
conflict setting.  Countries adopt state trials and truth 
22
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commissions in post-conflict settings nearly twice as frequently 
as during conflicts.  Surprisingly, however, states frequently 
adopt trials and truth commissions even during ongoing conflict.  
Amnesties occur as frequently during conflict as they do after 
civil wars. 
The prevalence of amnesty suggests that the 
accountability norm has not spread as far in the civil war context 
as perhaps this literature would lead us to expect.  Figure 1 
further illustrates this point.  The figure shows that the 
accountability norm, measured by the count of trials, has not 
reached the same level as amnesties.  Trials have increased in 
number, beginning in the 1990s, but amnesties appear to have 
increased more rapidly.  Combined with the information 
depicted in Table 1, amnesties seem to retain their appeal in civil 
war contexts, despite the diffusion of a global accountability 
norm. 
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Figure 1. Trials and Amnesties for Civil Wars
 
Multivariate analyses
To test the hypotheses generated ea
probit models 
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mechanisms during the 
characteristics play in the adoption of transitional justice 
mechanisms after the conflict terminated
probit analyses are shown below in table
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, During and 
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rlier, we estimate a series of 
in which each one of the five transitional justice 
is the dependent variable.  We first assess the 
the use of transitional justice 
conflict.  Next, we explore the role war 
.  The results of the 
s 2 and 3.  
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Table 2.  Probit Analyses of Mechanism Implementation 
During Civil Wars 
 
 1 2 3 4 
 
Trials – State 
Agents 
Truth 
Commission 
Amnesty – 
Rebels 
Amnesty – 
State Agents 
     
Avg. Annual Battle 
Deaths (log) 
0.195** 
(-0.084) 
0.164 
(-0.144) 
0.074 
(-0.064) 
0.303*** 
(-0.083) 
Revolutionary/ 
Secessionist 
0.435 1.126** 0.478** 0.790 
(-0.520) (-0.609) (-0.240) (-0.485) 
Duration 
0.020** 
(-0.009) 
0.046*** 
(-0.013) 
0.046*** 
(-0.016) 
0.032** 
(-0.013) 
UN Peacekeepers 
0.025 0.241 0.159 -0.086 
(-0.633) (-0.506) (-0.410) (-0.457) 
Constant 
-3.433*** -4.242*** -1.625*** -4.258*** 
(-0.815) (-1.138) (-0.433) (-0.861) 
N 151 151 151 151 
Log-likelihood -27.64 -26.69 -82.49 -39.15 
Χ2 16.30*** 15.60*** 21.04*** 22.67*** 
Pseudo-R2 0.12 0.32 0.16 0.26 
 
NOTE: * = significance at 90% level; ** = significance at 95%; 
*** = significance at 99%.  Robust standard errors, clustered by 
country, in parentheses.  The model for rebel trials was not 
significant (most likely due to the low number of observations), 
and therefore, is not included here.  Regional control variables 
were not included in the models because numerous regions 
predict failure perfectly (i.e., no mechanisms of a particular type 
were ever used during conflict in the region). 
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Table 3.  Probit Analyses of Mechanism Implementation in 
the Aftermath of Civil Wars 
 
 
1 2 3 4 
 
Trials – State 
Agents 
Truth 
Commissions 
Amnesty – 
State Agents 
Amnesty – 
Rebels 
     
Avg. Annual Battle 
Deaths (log) 
0.362** 
(-0.173) 
0.311* 
(-0.167) 
0.168 
(-0.118) 
-0.025 
(-0.074) 
Revolutionary/ 
Secessionist 
0.670 0.620 -0.318 0.307 
(-0.566) (-0.477) (-0.492) (-0.367) 
Duration 
0.032* 
(-0.018) 
0.004 
(0.019) 
0.007 
(-0.025) 
-0.011 
(-0.016) 
UN Peacekeepers 
1.338*** 0.853* 0.887** 1.425*** 
(-0.491) (-0.509) (-0.400) (-0.408) 
Peace Agreements 
-1.774** -0.686 0.531 0.413 
(-0.817) (-0.682) (-0.691) (-0.370) 
Victory 
-0.476 -0.177 1.023 0.628* 
(-0.558) (-0.557) (-0.699) (-0.366) 
Africa 
-1.602*** -0.359 0.355 -0.106 
(-0.561) (-0.491) (-0.529) (-0.431) 
Asia 
-2.839*** -1.210** -0.602 0.0322 
(-0.992) (-0.555) (-0.687) (-0.440) 
Americas 
-0.865  0.507 0.0986 
(-0.735)  (-0.688) (-0.515) 
Constant 
-2.884*** -2.965*** -2.970*** -0.988** 
(-0.963) (-0.886) (-0.748) (-0.487) 
N 118 95 118 118 
Log-likelihood -24.09 -30.41 -37.72 -63.89 
Χ2 17.85** 18.86** 17.20** 21.35*** 
Pseudo-R2 0.33 0.23 0.22 0.16 
 
NOTE: * = significance at 90% level; ** = significance at 95%; 
*** = significance at 99%.  Robust standard errors, clustered by 
country, in parentheses.  The model for rebel trials was not 
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significant (most likely due to the low number of observations), 
and therefore, is not included here.  The Americas region was 
dropped from the truth commission model because it predicts 
success perfectly (i.e., every country in the region has used one). 
 
During conflict, we find that three factors are 
particularly important in determining the adoption of specific 
transitional justice mechanisms.  First, the results in table 2 show 
that that those conflicts with higher death totals are more likely 
to employ trials for state agents.  Paradoxically, however, we also 
find that we are more likely to observe amnesties for state agents 
in deadlier conflicts.  This may suggest that severity increases the 
need to hold perpetrators accountable, but at the same time 
increases fears of re-instigating violence with too much justice.  
States thus limit efforts by balancing trials with amnesties.   
Second, our analysis illustrates that the duration of the 
conflict has a significant effect on all mechanisms.  In other 
words, the longer the conflict lasts the more likely the state is to 
attempt a wide range of mechanisms in hopes of bringing the 
fighting to an end.  This finding reveals interesting patterns with 
regard to the use of transitional justice.  While most of the 
scholarship assumes states adopt transitional justice following 
atrocities, this finding suggests that country leaders may view 
transitional justice as a mechanism that could also stop the 
violence. 
Conflicts fought over control of the central government 
are more likely to lead to the use of truth commissions and 
amnesties for state agents while the conflict is ongoing. This 
finding contradicts predictions in the literature that revolutionary 
wars lead to trials.  Instead, we find that states may adopt official 
investigations, in conjunction with amnesties, to cover the 
abuses of their own agents.  Holding a truth commission may 
have the effect of quieting international and domestic demands 
for accountability.  Interestingly, we also find that UN 
intervention during the conflict is not associated with 
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accountability or any form of transitional justice.  These findings 
would indicate that international actors do not push for 
particular mechanisms until they secure peace, or that the host 
state simply ignores these overtures while fighting continues. 
Now, we turn to the post-conflict results (Table 3). 
Similar to the analysis above, we hypothesized that those 
countries with higher levels of violence would be more likely to 
adopt trials and truth commissions in the post-conflict setting.  
We find supporting evidence that those post-conflict cases with 
higher battle deaths are indeed more likely to prosecute state 
agents and hold truth commissions.  We thus find that severity is 
likely to lead to accountability.  The literature also suggests that 
duration matters.  Specifically, protracted wars would likely 
prompt countries to adopt amnesties and truth commissions.  
We find instead that longer wars are more likely to lead to trials 
of state agents. 
As hypothesized, the presence of UN peacekeepers does 
have a positive effect on the likelihood a country will use trials 
or truth commissions.  Interestingly, their presence also predicts 
the use of amnesties for both sides.  We conclude that the 
presence of peacekeepers does not merely push a state towards 
accountability, but makes states more likely to pursue a wide 
range of transitional justice mechanisms.  Finally, we do not find 
evidence that negotiated ends to civil wars lead to amnesties as 
we hypothesized.  Instead, we find those conflicts that end in 
victory are highly correlated with amnesties for rebels.  This 
suggests that governments grant amnesties to any remaining 
rebels after they have defeated the insurgency.  Our control 
variables also suggest that geographical region is associated with 
the adoption of particular mechanisms.  Africa and Asia prove 
less likely to adopt trials of state agents, suggesting that the 
accountability norm has not penetrated these regions as much as 
it has others. 
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Does transitional justice bring peace? Preliminary 
reflections 
One goal of transitional justice is to increase the prospects and 
endurance of peace.  The frequency with which civil wars occur 
highlights the importance of addressing this question.  Yet this 
question poses a number of insurmountable challenges.  Of the 
151 civil wars included in this analysis, 118 terminated, and of 
that group, only seven wars began again.50  In other words, there 
is very little variation with which we can gain leverage on the 
ability of transitional justice mechanisms to bring sustained 
peace.  When conflicts end, countries tend to maintain peace 
with or without transitional justice mechanisms.   
We thus find very little evidence that transitional justice 
choices following conflict termination make conflicts any more 
or less likely to recur.  This finding suggests that countries may 
pursue transitional justice without risking renewed violence.  
Neither trials nor amnesties, in other words, jeopardize the 
peace process.  We do find some evidence that transitional 
justice, specifically amnesties, may aid in securing peace when 
used during conflict.  Of the 36 conflicts that terminated in a 
peace agreement, half (18) granted amnesties to rebels before the 
conflict ended.  In other cases, states use amnesties to 
successfully demobilize guerrilla groups or factions, which may 
have the effect of lessening the intensity of the conflict. 
 
Conclusion 
The evidence presented in this article informs our understanding 
of transitional justice used in post-conflict settings.  In particular, 
we find that countries increasingly use transitional justice in such 
contexts.  Over half of the cases of civil war in the data base 
employed at least one form of transitional justice mechanism, 
                                                        
50 As noted above, we code a new, separate conflict after a five-year gap 
between years of at least 25 battle deaths. 
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with a third using more than one mechanism.  This trend, alone, 
is largely understudied and worthy of additional research. 
This analysis also uncovers how characteristics of the 
conflict and its termination influence transitional justice choices.  
Our findings further demonstrate that during conflict, high 
death totals, the duration of the conflict, and the nature of the 
war increase the likelihood that a country will adopt transitional 
justice.  Higher death totals predict trials and amnesties for state 
agents.  This finding suggests that states approach the peace 
process by balancing accountability for some perpetrators with 
amnesties for others.  The long duration of the conflict increases 
the likelihood that states will adopt all types of mechanisms.  
This may either reflect the balance discussed above, sequencing, 
or experimenting with different efforts to promote peace.  
Additional research is necessary to determine the relationship of 
these mechanisms to each other.  Finally, we show that states 
use amnesties to resolve ongoing revolutionary wars, not trials, 
as expected.  States appear to recognize that the only successful 
mechanism for demobilization of revolutionary forces is a 
negotiated amnesty, rather than the threat of accountability.  
The post-conflict setting, however, generated a different 
set of findings.  Countries experiencing high levels of battle 
deaths and protracted wars tended to adopt accountability 
measures.  Such cases likely produce the necessary moral outrage 
to heighten pressure for trials.  War fatigue may also explain the 
desire to punish those engaged in violence and to deter future 
violations.  The finding on UN peacekeepers provides insight 
into the role of international forces behind transitional justice.  
They play no statistically significant role with regard to 
transitional justice during the conflict.  After the conflict, 
however, they prove significant in promoting amnesty and trials.  
The international community, in other words, has not presented 
a clear and unambiguous accountability norm as some of the 
literature suggests.  Moreover, while the existing literature 
assumes that African states emerging from war face pressure to 
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hold perpetrators accountable due to this global norm, our 
research suggests less, rather than more, accountability in Africa 
and Asia than in other regions of the world.   
The frequent use of amnesties after civil war is a 
noteworthy finding.  Indeed, it suggests that there is a role for 
amnesty in conflict termination, despite claims that it may inhibit 
peace.  While other transitional justice mechanisms also play a 
role in post-conflict settings, the consistent use of amnesty—
even in the presence of international actors—suggests amnesty 
may play a complementary role to accountability mechanisms.  
Uncovering how amnesty works in tandem with other 
transitional justice mechanisms would be a fruitful avenue of 
future research.  This analysis also demonstrates that transitional 
justice has neither advanced nor deterred peace in civil war 
contexts.  Future research might determine its impact on other 
important areas affecting post-conflict societies, specifically 
crime, citizen trust in the government, human rights abuses, and 
rule of law. 
 
 
Appendix: Civil War Cases, 1970-2005 
Afghanistan (1978-2005) 
Algeria (1991-2005) 
Angola (1975-2002) 
Angola (1991-2005: Cabinda) 
Argentina (1974-1977) 
Azerbaijan (1992-1994: Nagorno) 
Azerbaijan (1993-1995) 
Bangladesh (1975-1992: 
Chittagong) 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-
1995: Serbia) 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (1993-
1994: Croatia) 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (1993-
1995: Western Bosnia) 
Burkina Faso (1987) 
Burundi (1991-2005) 
Cambodia (1967-1998) 
Cameroon (1984) 
Central African Republic (2001-
2005) 
Chad (1966-2005) 
Chile (1973) 
Colombia (1964-2005) 
Congo, Democratic Republic of 
the (1977-1978) 
Congo, Democratic Republic of 
the (1996-2005) 
Congo, Republic of the (1993-
2002) 
Côte d'Ivoire (2002-2004) 
Croatia (1992-1995: Serbia) 
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Egypt (1993-1998) 
El Salvador (1972) 
El Salvador (1979-1991) 
Eritrea (1997-2003) 
Ethiopia (1964-1991: Eritrea) 
Ethiopia (1976-1991) 
Ethiopia (1976-2005: Ogaden) 
Ethiopia (1977-1991: Oromiya) 
Ethiopia (1989-1996: Afar) 
Ethiopia (1996-1999: Somali) 
Ethiopia (1999-2005: Oromiya) 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(1998-1999: Kosovo) 
Gambia (1981) 
Georgia (1991-1993) 
Georgia (1992: South Ossetia) 
Georgia (1992-1993: Abkhazia) 
Georgia (2004: South Ossetia) 
Ghana (1981-1983) 
Guatemala (1965-1995) 
Guinea (2000-2001) 
Guinea-Bissau (1998-1999) 
Haiti (1989-1991) 
Haiti (2004) 
India (1969-1971) 
India (1978-2005: Tripura) 
India (1982-2005: Manipur) 
India (1983-1993: 
Punjab/Khalistan) 
India (1989-2004: Bodoland) 
India (1989-2005: Kashmir) 
India (1990-2005) 
India (1990-2005: Assam) 
India (1992-2005: Nagaland) 
Indonesia (1975-1998: East 
Timor) 
Indonesia (1976-1978: West 
Papua) 
Indonesia (1990-1991: Aceh) 
Indonesia (1999-2005: Aceh) 
Iran (1979-1980: Arabistan) 
Iran (1979-1996: Kurdistan) 
Iran (1979-2005) 
Iraq (1961-1996: Kurdistan) 
Iraq (1982-1996) 
Iraq (2004-2005) 
Israel (1949-2005: Palestine) 
Kenya (1982) 
Laos (1959-1973) 
Laos (1989-1990) 
Lebanon (1975-1976) 
Lebanon (1982-1990) 
Lesotho (1998) 
Liberia (1980) 
Liberia (1989-2003) 
Macedonia (2001) 
Madagascar (1971) 
Malaysia (1974-1975) 
Malaysia (1981) 
Mali (1990-1994: Azawad) 
Mexico (1994-1996) 
Moldova (1992: Dniester) 
Morocco (1971) 
Morocco (1975-1989: Western 
Sahara) 
Mozambique (1977-1992) 
Myanmar (1948-1994) 
Myanmar (1949-2005: Karen) 
Myanmar (1959-2005: Shan) 
Myanmar (1961-1992: Kachin) 
Myanmar (1992-1996: Karenni) 
Myanmar (1997: Wa) 
Nepal (1996-2005) 
Nicaragua (1978-1989) 
Niger (1992-1997: Air and 
Azawad) 
Niger (1996-1997: Eastern Niger) 
Nigeria (1967-1970: Biafra) 
Nigeria (2004: Niger Delta) 
Nigeria (2004: Northern Nigeria) 
North Yemen (1962-1970) 
North Yemen (1980-1982) 
Oman (1972-1975) 
Pakistan (1971: East Pakistan) 
Pakistan (1974-1977: Baluchistan) 
Pakistan (1990-1996) 
Panama (1989) 
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Papua New Guinea (1989-1996: 
Bougainville) 
Paraguay (1989) 
Peru (1981-1999) 
Philippines (1969-2005) 
Philippines (1970-2005: 
Mindanao) 
Romania (1989) 
Russia (1993) 
Russia (1994-2005: Chechnya) 
Russia (1999: Dagestan) 
Rwanda (1990-2002) 
Saudi Arabia (1979) 
Senegal (1990-2003: Cascamance) 
Sierra Leone (1991-2000) 
Somalia (1978-2005) 
South Africa (1966-1988: 
Namibia) 
South Africa (1981-1988) 
South Yemen (1986) 
Soviet Union (1990: Azerbaijan) 
Soviet Union (1990-1991: 
Nagorno-Karabakh/Armenia) 
Spain (1980-1981: Basque) 
Spain (1987-1992: Basque) 
Sri Lanka (1971) 
Sri Lanka (1984-2005: Eelam) 
Sri Lanka (1989-1990) 
Sudan (1963-1972: Southern 
Sudan) 
Sudan (1971-1976) 
Sudan (1983-2005) 
Syria (1979-1982) 
Tajikistan (1992-1998) 
Thailand (1974-1982) 
Thailand (2003-2005: Patani) 
Togo (1986-1991) 
Trinidad and Tobago (1990) 
Tunisia (1980) 
Turkey (1984-2005: Kurdistan) 
Turkey (1991-1992) 
Uganda (1971-2005) 
United Kingdom (1971-1991: 
Northern Ireland) 
United Kingdom (1998: Northern 
Ireland) 
United States (2001-2005) 
Uruguay (1972) 
Uzbekistan (2000-2004) 
Venezuela (1992) 
Yemen (1994: South Yemen) 
Yugoslavia (1991: Croatia) 
Zimbabwe (1967-1979) 
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